War In The Falklands Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power

Examines the political atmosphere and events leading to the Falklands war and concludes that the war was caused by critical misperceptions on both sides. Analyzes British response with emphasis on force selection, strategy, 'Jointness,' and the role of airpower. Suggests that British victory hinged on a well-coordinated, joint warfighting effort, and highlights the key role played by airpower. Concludes with a caution concerning the potential for worldwide perceptions of reduced US power projection capabilities in light of budget-induced force reductions. Warns that these perceptions could lead, as they did in the Falklands, to military conflict. (FR).

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First published in 1985, The Falklands War was the first comprehensive work of its kind. The book brings together a wealth of work by scholars and practitioners in the fields of diplomacy, military affairs, and international politics and law. It provides a comprehensive and objective overview of the Falklands War and the underlying crisis that continued following it. This volume is a detailed study suitable for anyone wishing to expand their knowledge of the Falklands War.
An account of the origins and resolution of the Falklands War, looking in particular at the political management of the crisis and the broad strategic factors which influenced its conduct. The wider political repercussions and implications for defence and diplomacy are also considered.

Contains analyses of the war by several prominent U.S. experts on national security affairs. Their observations reflect the continuing debate on such key issues in U.S. defence planning - and in Soviet defence planning as well - as the controversy over large versus small carriers, the advantages and disadvantages of a diesel-versus nuclear-powered submarine fleet, the effectiveness of the Harrier-type aircraft, the influence of high technology on amphibious warfare, and the ever increasing use of 'smart' weapons by all-purpose conventional armed forces.

A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinian action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command. In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history.

This account of the Falklands War is by the commander of the British Task Force, Admiral Sandy Woodward. On 5 April 1982, three days after the invasion of the Falkland Islands, British armed forces were ordered to sail 8,000 miles to the South Atlantic unaware of what lay ahead of them or whether they would be committed to war with Argentina. In his memoirs, Admiral Sandy Woodward, Task Force commander from the aircraft carrier Hermes, take us from day one to day 100 of the conflict; from sailing through the waters of the Atlantic with hopes of a political settlement fading, and war becoming increasingly likely, to the repulse of the Argentinian navy and the daring amphibious landing at San Carlos Water.

This is a collection of important new work on the Falklands Conflict by the leading authorities in the field, British and Argentine. The themes of the volume are defence and diplomacy, and the problematic relationship between them. The authors investigate aspects of the conflict from the relevance of Falklands/Malvinas past, through the diplomatic and military crisis of 1982, to shifts in public opinion in both countries. Contributors include Peter Beck, Peter Calvert, Lawrence Freedman, Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Guillermo Makin and Paul Rogers.

This book examines the debate which has long raged in Britain about the meaning of the Falklands War. Using literary critical methods, Monaghan examines how the Thatcherite reading of the war as a myth of British greatness reborn was developed through political speeches and journalistic writing. He then goes on to discuss a number of films, plays, cartoon strips and travel books which have subverted the dominant myth by finding national metaphors of a very different kind in the Falklands War.
This book is based on a conference at Sandhurst Military College held to re-examine the events in the Falklands of spring 1982. It is a mix of those who participated in the event with historians, political scientists and journalists.

This book offers an empirically informed understanding of how identity and agency become wholly embedded within practices of media-remembering. It draws upon data collected from the British military, the BBC and Falkland Islanders during the 30th Anniversary of the Falklands war to uniquely offer multiple perspectives on a single ‘remembering’ phenomenon. The study offers an analysis of the convergence, interconnectedness and interdependence of media and remembering, specifically the production, interpretation and negotiation of remembering in the media ecology. In so doing it not only examines the role of media in the formation and sustaining of collective memory but also the ways those who remember or are remembered in media texts become implicated in these processes.

On 1 April 1982 Major Mike Norman, commander of Naval Party 8901, was looking forward to a peaceful yearlong tour of duty on the Falkland Islands. But events turned out differently, for the next day the Argentines invaded and he and his forty-three Royal Marines found themselves fighting for their lives. They took up defensive positions around Government House and on the approach to Stanley from Cape Pembroke to protect the Governor Rex Hunt and delay the advance to Stanley. They were prepared to die executing his orders. After a desperate battle in the gardens and even inside the house against superior numbers Rex Hunt ordered them to lay down their arms. As the surrender took place, an Argentine told a marine: The islands are ours now. The response was simple: We will be back. They were, and this is their story. The Royal Marines of Naval Party 8901 as well as some members of the previous detachment volunteered to join the Task Force and, some seventy-five days later, the men who witnessed the raising of the Argentine flag over the islands on 2 April saw the triumphant return of the Union Jack. Mike Normans dramatic account draws on his own vivid recollections, the log recording the defense of Government House, the testimony of the marines under his command and newly released files from government archives. It is a powerful and moving tribute to the marines who confronted the Argentines when they invaded and then fought to force them out.

Panoramic, transnational history of the Falklands War and its imperial dimensions, which explores how a minor squabble mushroomed into war.

First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The Falklands War was one of the strangest in British history – 28,000 men sent to fight for a tiny relic of empire 8,000 miles from home. At the time, many Britons saw it as a tragic absurdity, but the British victory confirmed the quality of British arms and boosted the political fortunes of the Conservative government. But it left a chequered aftermath; it was of no wider significance for British interests and taught no lessons. It has since been overshadowed by the two Gulf Wars, however, its political ramifications cannot be overestimated. Max Hastings’ and Simon Jenkins’ account of the conflict is a modern classic of war reportage and the definitive book on the war. Republished as part of the Pan Military Classics series, The Battle for the Falklands is a vivid chronicle of a call to arms and a thoughtful and informed analysis of an astonishing chapter in the history of our times.

Many military accounts of the British side of the Falklands War have been published as well as memoirs written by servicemen who took part, so this
aspect of the story of the Argentine occupation and the British liberation of this remote territory in the South Atlantic is well known. But little attention has been paid to the Falkland islanders who had direct personal experience of this extraordinary crisis in their history. That is why the previously unpublished diaries of Neville Bennett and his wife Valerie, a fireman and a nurse who lived with their two daughters in Port Stanley throughout the war, is such vivid and revealing reading. As chief fireman Neville was frequently called out to deal with fires and other incidents during the occupation, and each day he recorded what happened and what he thought about it in his sharp and forthright way. Valerie saw a different side of the occupation through her work at the Stanley hospital where she had to handle the Argentines as well as daily accidents and emergencies. Their joint record of the exceptional circumstances in the Falklands in April, May and June 1982 gives us a fascinating inside view of family life during the occupation and of their relations with the Argentine soldiers and commanders. It is engrossing reading.

This book shows how to predict wars. More specifically, it tells us how to anticipate in a timely fashion the scope and extent of interstate conflict. By focusing on how all governments--democratic or not--seek to secure public support before undertaking risky moves such as starting a war, Getting to War provides a methodology for identifying a regime's intention to launch a conflict well in advance of the actual initiation. The goal here is the identification of leading indicators of war. Getting to War develops such a leading political indicator by a systematic examination of the ways in which governments influence domestic and international information flows. Regardless of the relative openness of the media system in question, we can accurately gauge the underlying intentions of those governments by a systematic analysis of opinion-leading articles in the mass media. This analysis allows us to predict both the likelihood of conflict and what form of conflict--military or diplomatic/economic--will occur. Theoretically, this book builds on a forty-year-old insight by Karl Deutsch--that all governments seek to mobilize public opinion through mass media and that careful analysis of such domestic media activity could provide an "early warning network" of international conflict. By showing how to tap the link between conflict initiation and public support, this book provides both a useful tool for understanding crisis behavior as well as new theoretical insights on how domestic politics help drive foreign policy. Getting to War will be of interest to political scientists who study international disputes and national security as well as social scientists interested in media studies and political communication. General readers with an interest in military or diplomatic history--particularly U.S. history--will find that Getting to War provides an entirely new perspective on how to understand wars and international crises. W. Ben Hunt is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University

This book provides new light on the way the Argentine forces were organized for war, the plans and reactions of the commanders, the sufferings of the soldiers and the shame and disillusionment of defeat. Martin Middlebrook has produced a genuine 'first' with this unique work. Martin Middlebrook is the only British historian to have been granted open access to the Argentines who planned and fought the Falklands War. It ranks with Liddel Hart's The Other side of the Hill in analyzing and understanding the military thinking and strategies of Britain's sometime enemy, and is essential reading for all who wish to understand the workings of military minds. The book provides new light on the way Argentine forces were organized for war, the plans and reactions of the commanders, the sufferings of the soldiers and the shame and disillusionment of defeat.

"As I toured the wards of that remarkable ship during my flying visit, I found all of my seriously wounded soldiers who had been helicoptered off the battlefield, some of whom I thought I would never see again, and saw for myself the inspirational care of the Naval medical and nursing staff that had saved lives and on which recovery was depending. It was hardly a mile offshore, but it felt a very long way from Mount Tumbledown." Lieutenant General
Sir John Kiszely KCB, MC, Company Commander in 2nd Battalion Scots Guards 1982 "These are the personal stories of the injured servicemen and the Naval Nurses and Doctors who fought the all-important battle to 'bring them back alive'." Brian Hanrahan BBC War Correspondent during The Falklands War 1982 "The story of dedication and courage on The Hospital Ship Uganda. Author Nicci Pugh honours all those who were treated and served on board Her Majesty's Hospital Ship Uganda during the Falklands War in 1982." Michael Nicholson CBE, ITN War Correspondent during the Falklands War 1982 "Nicci Pugh is to be congratulated on weaving together the threads of this hidden side of the Falklands conflict. A success story emerges of inter-service cooperation, which shows what can be achieved when there is no precedent to follow. White Ship - Red Crosses explains why The Hospital Ship Uganda became such a reassuring presence to those fighting in the South Atlantic in 1982." Captain Grahame A. Burton RD* FNI In 1982 P&O Chief Officer SS Uganda and Lt Cdr RNR "Not before time, the story of the Naval nursing staff on board The Hospital Ship Uganda is being told. My own memories are vague regarding much of the early days after the bombing of the Sir Galahad, but nothing detracts from the comfort and security I felt as I was cared for and nursed on board The Hospital Ship at that time. Much has been written regarding the battles and the soldier's point of view during the Falklands War, but the perspective of the medical teams has often been overlooked and ignored. This is a story that needs to be told and listened to, not just because it is a great book and a very good read but because of its powerful message. White Ship - Red Crosses is a triumph for all injured servicemen but let's not forget the tributes deserved by those unremittingly hard-working nurses and medical teams, without whom my survival would not have been possible. Author Nicci Pugh, who worked as an Operating Theatre Sister in the midst of the casualties as they arrived on board The Hospital Ship Uganda in 1982 has captured the whole essence of treating and caring for the casualties on a mass scale in a war zone." Simon Weston CBE Former patient on board Her Majesty's Hospital Ship Uganda, during The Falklands War 1982 "Not before time, the story of the Naval nursing staff on board The Hospital Ship Uganda. This is a story that needs to be told." Simon Weston CBE

In early summer 1982--winter in the South Atlantic--Argentina's military junta invades the Falklands. Within days, a British Royal Navy Task Force is assembled and dispatched. This is the story of D Squadron, 22 SAS, commanded by Cedric Delves. The relentless tempo of events defies belief. Raging seas, inhospitable glaciers, hurricane-force winds, helicopter crashes, raids behind enemy lines--the Squadron prevailed against them all, but the cost was high. Eight died and more were wounded or captured. Holding fast to their humanity, D Squadron's fighters were there at the start and end of the Falklands War, the first to raise a Union Jack over Government House in Stanley. Across an Angry Sea is a chronicle of daring, skill and steadfastness among a tight-knit band of brothers; of going awry, learning fast, fighting hard, and winning through.

With the sudden Argentine invasion of the remote Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 the United Kingdom found itself at war. Due to the resolve of a determined Prime Minister and the resourcefulness of the Armed Forces, a Task Force, code named Operation CORPORATE, was quickly dispatched. Remarkably just over two months later, the Islands were liberated and the invaders defeated. By any standards this was a remarkable feat of all arms cooperation made possible by political resolve, sound planning, strong leadership and the courage and determination of the combatants. Martin Middlebrook, one of the most skillful historians of the 20th Century, has woven the many strands of this extraordinary military achievement into a fascinating, thorough and highly readable account of the Campaign. For a full understanding of what it took to win this war there will be no better account to read than this.
Using four warship-centered examples, this book shows how naval battles are won or lost—and how technological advantage is rarely as decisive in defeat or victory as is often claimed. • Focuses on four ship-centered battle narratives: the battle of Trafalgar, the battle of Jutland, the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, and the Falklands War • Identifies 11 perspectives that explain victory and defeat in naval operations • Provides a history-based survey of successful naval operations while highlighting the nature of naval operations in the 21st century • Presents information written in a clear, reader-friendly style without compromising on its scholarly standards of content and accuracy • Offers fascinating reading for naval college students, general audiences who enjoy naval history, and naval historians alike

This monograph addresses the Malvinas/Falklands conflict from the Argentine perspective. Leaders must understand all sides of narratives in order to frame the right problem in armed conflicts. Existing Anglo-American literature does not reflect the complete narrative associated with the conflict. This does not mean that what has been written is not true, but that the Argentine view has not been captured effectively. This conflict escalated into war between Argentina and Great Britain between April and June of 1982, but the outcome of that war did not solve the problem. The author is an Argentine Army Aviator Officer who wants to take a balanced and objective view. The Anglo-American view interprets the Argentine behavior as an invasion, the Argentines' view is perceived as a recovery of the Islands without bloodshed after 149 years of persistent claims. From the Argentine view the war was triggered by Great Britain with the British decision to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano on 2nd May 1982, outside of the theater of operations, causing the deaths of more than three hundred Argentine sailors. Until that point in the conflict, Great Britain had suffered no casualties in the Argentine recovery of the Islands. The Malvinas/Falklands conflict includes issues about sovereignty, colonialism, and diplomatic misunderstandings. If the conflict reignites, it has the propensity and the potentiality to transmit the issues latent in the Argentine domestic conflict to the entire South American region, acting against the interests of the United States and the values of partnership in the international community.

"The Falklands/Malvinas crisis of the spring of 1982 concerning sovereignty over the islands offers classic examples of multilateral, bilateral, and third-party mediation of international conflict. The United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, United States shuttle diplomacy, Peruvian conciliation efforts, and the UN Secretary General interventions failed to avert bloodshed. The armed conflict grew out of a long history of territorial dispute and was also rooted in the failure of Britain and Argentina to resolve their differences after many years of bilateral diplomatic negotiations. The conflict had developed in three main areas of contention. The first concerned the legal aspect and the claims to sovereignty of both Britain and Argentina to the Falklands. Another was Argentina's constant diplomatic pressure in pursuing its claims to the Islands. The third referred to the practical aspects for Britain of maintaining sovereignty and to their attempts to find an equitable way to relinquish it while assuring that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders would be respected. In 1826 Argentina resettled the islands and in 1833 the British evicted the Argentines. The UN, in 1965, passed a resolution which called for Britain and Argentina to proceed with negotiations to settle the sovereignty issue. These negotiations were carried on until 1982 without resolution of the problem. A new round of negotiations began in March of 1982. The Argentine ruling junta claimed that the negotiations had broken down and they asserted that they would press their claim by other than peaceful means. A month later Argentina invaded the islands to reassert their claims of sovereignty. The US third-party mediation effort began a week later and the effort was characterized by shuttle diplomacy which took place in Buenos Aires, London and Washington, D.C. At the end of the month, Secretary of State Haig announced that the United States would provide support requested by the British. The Peruvian government worked very hard in parallel with the US diplomacy to put an end to the crisis. The UN Security Council and the Organization of American States OAS led for an end to hostilities and a withdrawal of forces on both sides. The OAS supported the Argentine position.
Crisis management efforts in Britain were under the Foreign Office and involved round-the-clock participation of key governmental, military, and civilian agencies. The U.S. Interagency group was formed at the Department of State and was composed of representatives of the various State Department functional and geographical bureaus and the Pentagon. Central Intelligence Agency CIA, and the National Security Agency NSA liaisons were activated. On April 5, 1982, Britain sent a large naval force to the Falklands. The diplomats involved with the shuttle diplomacy knew, that once the task force arrived in the vicinity of the Falklands, that whatever diplomatic efforts were ongoing would be overtaken by events. The troops went ashore on East Falkland Island on May 21. The British and Argentine press were very partisan and nationalistic themes were evident on both sides. Argentine preparations for their invasion were formulated rather rapidly and the army command structure, supply system, and training were inadequate to the task of securing the islands militarily. Munitions were in comparatively short supply, had been procured from many diverse sources, and additional armaments were not available. In the pipeline. The Argentine Navy lost the cruiser Belgrano early in the conflict and thereafter seldom ventured out of port. Argentine airpower was the main threat and performed well. The pilots were well trained, the Exocet guided missile was effective, and the tactics and techniques they employed were professionally executed. The British were ill-prepared to fight in an area far from home. Ascension Island which was about half the distance to the war zone, was used as a refueling stop and US logistical and fuel support was vital. The British land units were very effective and were better led than their Argentine counterparts. The local population was not harmed by the military operations. The British Navy performed well and the use of improved technology in radar, munitions, helicopter carriers, intelligence, and warning systems would have been helpful. In the post-war period the British improved the airport at Port Stanley and 4,500 soldiers were stationed there to guard a population of approximately 1,500. The British wanted to reduce tensions. The Argentines sought negotiations with sovereignty and the British refused to have negotiations without sovereignty. In the Argentine view, the situation remained unchanged.---Document.

Cites over 800 substantial books, document collections, and journal articles about the diplomatic, military, and political aspects of the 1982 war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands; newspaper articles and works less than about 2,000 words are not included. Most of the works cited are in English or Spanish, giving British or Argentine perspectives, but other American and European views are also cited. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

A growing number of scholars have sought to re-centre emotions in our study of international politics, however an overarching book on how emotions matter to the study of politics and war is yet to be published. This volume is aimed at filling that gap, proceeding from the assumption that a nuanced understanding of emotions can only enhance our engagement with contemporary conflict and war. Providing a range of perspectives from a diversity of methodological approaches on the conditions, maintenance and interpretation of emotions, the contributors interrogate the multiple ways in which emotions function and matter to the study of global politics. Accordingly, the innovative contribution of this volume is its specific engagement with the role of emotions and constitution of emotional subjects in a range of different contexts of politics and war, including the gendered nature of war and security; war traumas; post-conflict reconstruction; and counterinsurgency operations. Looking at how we analyse emotions in war, why it matters, and what emotions do in global politics, this volume will be of interest to students and scholars of critical security studies and international relations alike.

While many books have been written on the Falklands War, this is the first to focus on the vital aspect of logistics. The challenges were huge; the lack of preparation time; the urgency; the huge distances involved; the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four.??After a brief discussion of events
leading to Argentina's invasion the book describes in detail the rush to re-organise and deploy forces, despatch a large task force, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the Task Force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theatre resupply, the set-backs and finally the restoring of order after victory. Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties etc. The lessons learnt have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs and this book fills an important gap.

This book explores the Falklands War from an Argentinian perspective, taking into consideration three aspects. First, it introduces classified documents after the end of the thirty-year ban. Second, it highlights various conceptual, institutional, and doctrinal reforms in the Argentinian and other South American armed forces as a result of lessons learned from the Malvinas War. Third, it reflects on the war's long-term implications on Argentina’s foreign policy and society. The book offers the first comprehensive, multi-level analysis, and Argentinian scholarship on the conflict. It is based on original primary data, mainly official documentation and interviews with military officers and combatants.

Most individuals realise that we have a moral obligation to avoid the evils of war. But this realization raises a host of difficult questions when we, as responsible individuals, witness harrowing injustices such as "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia or starvation in Somalia. With millions of lives at stake, is war ever justified? And, if so, for what purpose? In this book, Richard J. Regan confronts these controversial questions by first considering the basic principles of just-war theory and then applying those principles to historical and ongoing conflicts. Part One presents two opposing viewpoints: first, that war is not subject to moral norms and, second, that war is never morally permissible. The author rejects both perspectives, and moves to define the principles of just-war theory. He evaluates the roles of the president, Congress and, most importantly, the UN Security Council in determining when long-term US military involvement is justified. The moral limits of war conduct and the moral problem of using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons are also discussed. On the just cause to wage war, Regan argues that defense of nations and nationals - whether in self-defense or in defense of others - remains the "only" classical cause that in the modern world would justify resorting to war. With respect to military intervention in secessionist and revolutionary wars, he contends that such intervention might be justified, but that prudence dictates extreme caution. In considering acceptable war conduct, Regan elaborates the specific principle of discrimination and proportionality; he maintains that civilians uninvolved in the enemy's war should not be directly targeted and that the costs of military action must be proportionate to the anticipated benefits of destroying military targets. The second part of the book presents case studies of eight historical wars - World War I, the Vietnam War, the Falklands War, the revolution and civil war in Nicaragua, the civil war in El Salvador, the Gulf War, the intervention in Somalia, and the Bosnian War - and poses several provocative questions about each. It invites readers and students to apply just-war principles to complex war-related situations and to understand the factual contingencies involved in moral judgements about war decisions. The book should be of particular interest to students of the moral issues of international relations and to readers interested more generally in philosophy, theology and political science.

Soldiers and journalists alike wasted no time in telling the story of the campaign to recapture the Falkland Islands after the Argentinian invasion in April, 1982. Almost without exception, however, they are concerned largely on the role of the Army, for it was the part they played which particularly fired the
public imagination, and it may be said that the role of the Royal and Merchant Navies, the abiding images of which are for many the pictures of the exploding frigate Antelope, and the burning Atlantic Conveyor, has hitherto been overshadowed by the yomping of the Marines and the exploits of certain gentleman of the press. Yet none of them would have been there at all had the Royal Navy not provided the necessary transport, not to mention air cover and bombardment support. In the book David Brown, head of what was formally the Naval Historical Branch at the Ministry of Defence, tells in full for the first time the extraordinary story of how the fleet was assembled; of how merchant-ships from luxury liners such as the Canberra to cargo-carriers of every description were 'Taken Up Form Trade' and, in a staggeringly short time, converted to their new role. He describes the stupendous problems presented by the assembling, and stowing, of the thousands of tons of stores and equipment needed by the Expeditionary Forces and the way in which these problems were dealt with.

This book traces the interaction of war and diplomacy and analyzes why the Falklands conflict of 1982 engaged the British and Argentine people in a deeply personal way. It also examines the interpretation of the war in Britain, revealing how the war--a successful one--was seen by its critics as an example of "Thatcher's Britain." This "small war" exemplified what one historian calls "the myriad faces of war" and had--and has--resonances larger than its size.

I en række afhandlinger gennemgås en række vigtige erfaringer fra Falklandskrigen, set ud fra et amerikansk synspunkt.

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